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HEARING WOMEN NOT BEING HEARD: ON
CAROL GILLIGAN'S GETTING CIVILIZED
AND THE COMPLEXITY OF VOICE
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER*
C AROL Gilligan's essay, Getting Civilized,1 raises issues that are
critical for thinking about gender and law in the nineties. Moving
beyond the notion of "different voice" that shaped her earlier work,2
she identifies a number of obstacles that make it difficult for women
to express their "voice" and to have their voices heard in society and,
by implication, in law. Because I agree with Carol Gilligan as to the
significance of these obstacles, in this comment I further explore the
complexity of "voice" in the context of what I call "feminist lawmak-
ing," the practice by which feminist advocates have sought to trans-
form law.
For Gilligan, Anita Hill testifying against Clarence Thomas was a
profound historical moment. Hill, the "Rosa Parks" of gender wars,3
was talking to the country; Gilligan remembers "listening to Anita
Hill-hearing her, and then hearing her not being heard."'4 The story
of Anita Hill is a parable for the problems of "second-stage" femi-
nism. The first stage is to recognize women's "different voice," or, as I
will discuss, voices, and to make it possible for these voices to be
heard. The second stage is to recognize all of the ways in which wo-
men's voices can be heard and yet are not really heard-to identify
the complexity of voice.
Carol Gilligan's work on "different voice" has had considerable im-
pact on the development of feminist legal theory5 generally and also
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful to Susan N. Herman
and Betty Levinson for their comments and to Suzanne Brackley and Stephanie Ma-
nes for invaluable research assistance. A Brooklyn Law School Faculty Research
grant generously supported my research and writing. This essay is part of a larger
project on tensions within feminist legal theory and practice.
1. Carol Gilligan, Getting Civilized, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 17 (1994).
2. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's De-
velopment (1982).
3. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 22.
4. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
5. Carol Gilligan's work, particularly her book In A Different Voice, supra note 2,
has clearly influenced feminist legal theory. A Westlaw search in September 1994
using the search words "Gilligan and feminist theory" found 242 articles in law
reviews.
For examples of application of Gilligan's work to the law, see Leslie Bender, From
Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and An Ethic of Care in
Law, 15 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In A Different
Voice: Relational Feminism, Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 858 (1993); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Specula-
tions on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women's LJ. 39 (1985); Deborah
L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 Stan. L
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has influenced my work.6 I have been concerned with the complexity
of how women's voices are heard in the process of "feminist lawmak-
ing." For example, I have explored the difficulties that the concept of
"battered woman syndrome" poses because it is misheard or misun-
derstood "as reinforcing stereotypes of women as passive, sick, power-
less and victimized." 7 Although the purpose of admitting expert
testimony on battering was to describe many of the common exper-
iences that battered women share, it is too often "misused and
misheard to enshrine old stereotypes in a new form."' Progress has
been made in incorporating women's voices into law, but this does not
mean that these voices can be heard by the listener or by society at
large, or that they will be heard accurately. Thus I have described the
challenge for feminists in law: "How do we describe and name a legal
problem for women-describe it in detail, in context-and translate it
to unsympathetic courts in such a way that it is not misheard and, at
the same time, does not remain static? How do we develop legal the-
ory and practice that is not only accurate to the realities of women's
experience but also takes account of complexity and allows for
change?" 9 As Gilligan observes, to explore and "explain the 'how'"
creates an opening for profound transformation.10
In law, women's voices have begun to be heard. Women's voices
have had an impact on reshaping the law in areas such as violence
against women, employment discrimination, family law and reproduc-
tive rights. There has been an explosion of feminist legal scholarship
that has explored issues affecting women in almost every area of the
law. Women are entering the legal profession in droves, and there are
now two women on the Supreme Court. The development of feminist
legal theory and practice has meant that a wide range of women's ex-
Rev. 1547, 1550-54 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 570-91 (1986). Gilligan's work is now
a staple of casebooks on women and the law and feminist legal theory. See Katherine
T. Bartlett, Gender and Law 589-669 (1993) (Chapter 5: "Women's Different
Voice(s)"); Mary Becker, Cynthia Grant Bowman & Morrison Torrey, Feminist Juris-
prudence 59-67 (1994) (Chapter 3B: "Differences in the Eighties").
6. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
From the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589, 613-18 (1986) (explaining that
Gilligan's work suggests that rights discourse in the women's movement can foster
women's individual self-development and sense of collective identity); see also Mary
Joe Frug, Progressive Feminist Legal Scholarship: Can We Claim "A Different Voice?"
15 Harv. Women's LJ. 37 (1992) (discussing how Gilligan's "different voice" theories
might affect feminist legal strategy); Judi Greenberg, Martha Minow & Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Contradiction and Revision: Progressive Feminist Legal Scholars Respond
to Mary Joe Frug, 15 Harv. Women's L.J. 65 (1992) (same).
7. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 195,
214 (1986).
8. Id. at 215.
9. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
10. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 30 (emphasis added).
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periences are now brought into the open." Experiences that were
previously invisible like rape, intimate violence, sexual harassment
and incest are now made visible. But again, as Gilligan describes, visi-
bility does not mean being listened to, that the listener "gets it," or
that the listener, or society at large, has really "taken it in."
There are many reasons why it is difficult for women's voices to be
heard. The first is that there are many "different voices." Feminist
activists and scholars now recognize that a wide range of different the-
oretical perspectives, many different feminisms and feminist theories,
and many different feminist strategies exist."2 In addition, the devel-
opment of a strong multicultural feminist community, broad critiques
of feminist essentialism and attention to issues of race, class, disability
and heterosexism also have enriched feminist dialogue. These devel-
opments underscore a paradox in feminist theory and practice: "By
definition, feminism claims to speak from the experience of women.
Yet that experience counsels attention to its own diversity, and to the
role of contextual variations and multiple identities in mediating gen-
der differences."' 3 Thus, although the Ninth Circuit adopted a nomi-
nally "feminist" "reasonable woman" standard for sexual
harassment,'4 there is much disagreement among feminist legal schol-
ars as to whether this standard is a good thing.15
11. The narrative turn in feminist legal scholarship, based on the sharing of per-
sonal stories, has also brought the range of women's experiences into the open. How-
ever, in order to emphasize the multiplicity of voices, it is particularly important that
these narratives be complex and ambiguous, rather than positing a particular experi-
ence or perspective as unitary or "the truth." See Kathryn Abrams, Unity, Narrative
and Law, 13 Stud. in L. Pol. and Soc'y 3, 22-23 (1993). It is also important that they
link the particular experiences recounted with more general implications and connect
them to feminist practice. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality:
Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 520, 521 (1992); Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences:
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 25, 25-26 (1990).
12. For example, major casebooks on feminism and law describe many different
feminist theories. In Gender and Law, supra note 5, there are six different feminist
theoretical frameworks: formal equality, substantive equality, nonsubordination, wo-
men's different voice(s), autonomy and non-essentialism. In Feminist Jurisprudence,
supra note 5, the chapter on Feminist Theory includes discussions of feminist method-
ology, difference in the eighties, dominance theory, formal equality, hedonic femi-
nism, pragmatic feminism, socialist feminism, postmodern feminism, essentialism and
heterosexism.
13. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1554.
14. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (using the reasonable wo-
man standard to judge sexual harassment in the workplace).
15. See Schneider, supra note 11, at 559-67 (questioning whether the "reasonable
woman" standard "penalize[s] women's different experiences and women's depar-
tures from a stereotypical norm"); see also Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbelievable:
Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 10 Law & Ineq. J.
285, 298 (1992) (pointing out that the reasonable woman standard may actually
"threaten the credibility of a broad range of women" by excluding "the varied per-
spectives of women of different races, classes, sexual orientations, and abilities").
Compare Naomi R Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language. The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and In Practice, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1398, 1434 (1992) (arguing that
1994]
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Many of the issues that women are raising, like violence or sexual
harassment, bring conflict into the open. Gilligan suggests that in the
face of such conflict, men disconnect from women's concerns and wo-
men dissociate parts of their selves;' 6 both phenomena might also be
understood as forms of denial. 7 These subjects are extremely threat-
ening, and there is always the "pull of the familiar."' 8 This description
of a different process of disconnection and dissociation resonates with
lawyers' observations about ways in which both men and women may
be problematic jurors in cases involving battered women who have
been charged with homicide or assault of an intimate partner: male
jurors are more likely to minimize the violence or blame the woman,
while women are more likely to say "I wouldn't let that happen to
me."'1
9
Lack of credibility accorded to women is another serious problem.
Judges may let women's voices into the courtroom, but state Gender
Bias Task Forces and a wide range of scholarly literature confirm that
women's voices, whether as litigant or expert, are not accorded much
credibility or weight even when they are admitted.2 ° There are also
many subtle ways of what Gilligan calls "shutting women up" after
the reasonable woman standard is preferable because it teaches courts "to think from
a different perspective than that of the reasonable man or person"). Even Cahn, how-
ever, proposes a new "contextualized" standard which would recognize different
voices among women. Id. at 1435. But see Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and
the Ordinary Man, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1411, 1417 (1992) (praising the Ninth Circuit's
effort to shape new attitudes via a standard that "discourages employees from touch-
ing one another" and "contemplates new ways for working men and women to relate
to one another").
16. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 18.
17. For a discussion of denial, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Pri-
vacy, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 973, 979-85 (1991).
18. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 20.
19. It is also widely recognized by attorneys that female jurors often judge female
victims more harshly, since the victim's lifestyle is always under scrutiny. See David
Margolick, Ideal Juror for O.J. Simpson: Football Fan Who Can Listen, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 1994, at B18 (citing Linda A. Fairstein, Chief, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit,
Manhattan District Attorney's office).
20. For a discussion of problems of lack of credibility accorded women, see Lynn
Hecht Schafran, The Three C's of Credibility, Judges J. (forthcoming January 1995).
Schrafran, Director of the National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality
for Women and Men in the Courts, defines "credibility" as:
[A] word that encompasses many meanings, truthful, believable, trustwor-
thy, intelligent, convincing, reasonable, competent, capable, someone to be
taken seriously, someone who matters in the world. "Credible" is the crucial
attribute for a lawyer, litigant, complainant, defendant or witness. Yet for
women, achieving credibility in and out of the courtroom is no easy task.
Id. See also Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist
Perspective on the Proof Process, 4 Crim. L.F. 327 (1993); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just
the Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth,
37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 123, 128-33 (1992); Gender and Justice in the Courts: A Report
to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender Bias in the Judicial
System, 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 539,703-04 (1992) ("Social science research shows that in
a variety of contexts, both males and females perceive females as being less credible
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they have "gotten in" to the institutions where they have not been
welcome; for example, reimposing the values of the traditional disci-
plines,2' spraying graffiti on bathroom walls, telling women that they
will be "labeled" if they take women's studies courses or use the "f-
word" to describe themselves, or including misogynistic comments in
course evaluations. Finally, if women's voices are really heard, then
there is always backlash, for the best way to undermine the message is
to kill the messenger.' Think, for example, of the incredible scrutiny
to which Anita Hill has been subjected, ranging from David Brock's
scurrilous attack2 to countless explorations of her personal life.24
Yet, Carol Gilligan and I share hope. Women do speak up and re-
sist, and we must continue to do so, despite our more complex under-
standing of the many ways in which our voices may not be heard.
Gilligan talks about "political resistance," particularly on the part of
adolescent girls with whom she has worked: "girls continuing to speak
what they were feeling and thinking, and to talk about what they were
seeing and hearing when it went against the grain of what was socially
constructed or generally accepted as true."'  I see this in my own six-
teen-year-old daughter, Anna, and in Shannon Faulkner's courageous
fight to enter the Citadel.26 The different ways that women resist op-
pression have also increasingly been explored by feminist legal schol-
ars27 and is a promising area of work. This notion of resistance is
than males in all senses of the term, and that recent years have by no means elimi-
nated these attitudes.").
21. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 28.
22. See generally Susan Faludi, Backlash (1991).
23. David Brock, The Real Anita Hill (1993).
24. See, eg., Janet Cawley, Thomas Heatedly Denies Allegations: Capitol Hill
Drama Tarnishes Two Lives, Chi. Trib., Oct. 12, 1991, at Cl; Bill Hewitt, She Could
Not Keep Silent: Anita Hill's Challenge to Clarence Thomas-and the Nation-Grew
Out of Convictions Formed by Her Oklahoma Upbringing, People, Oct. 28, 1991, at
40; Richard Lacayo, A Question of Character: Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill Were
Both Known for Truthfulness and Integrity-Until Now, Tune, Oct. 21, 1991, at 43;
Professor's Roots Stretch From Farm to Yale: Rural, Religious Background Left Anita
Hill Idealistic, Friends Say, Star Trib., Oct. 11, 1991, at 12A.
25. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 25-26.
26. Shannon Faulkner, who has fought her way into the Citadel military college in
South Carolina, is an example of a young woman who has the courage to speak up.
She is articulate, poised and direct, not afraid to confront the military's powerful sta-
tus quo and eager to forge a path for other women to follow. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, "her suit has started brush fires across the state." See Catherine S. Manegold,
The Citadel's Lone Wolf, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 56. Since
Shannon began her struggle "[a]t least 43 women have written to the Citadel for ap-
plications or information." Id. at 59.
27. Resistance theory examines the way in which individuals accommodate, medi-
ate and resist dominant social practices; resistance theorists posit that nonconformity
to accepted norms and values can be interpreted as a form of political resistance. It
can be difficult to determine when those who deviate from acceptable social standards
are expressing some form of political protest or exhibiting freedom from social con-
straints, and when such "deviance" is merely the result of not having a broader spec-
trum of choices. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, ExiL" Power and the Idea of
1994]
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important for, in Gilligan's and my own most hopeful mode, that
resistance is what made Anita Hill speak up and what will give other
girls and women the courage to speak up. Aware of the complexity of
voice and the obstacles that face us, we must make sure that our
voices will not only be heard, but also listened to, understood and
integrated into, as Carol Gilligan puts it, "Civilization." 8
Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283, 1307-
19 (1992) (rejecting the idea that "exiting" an oppressive environment is the primary
manner of resisting oppression); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Wo-
men: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev 1 (1991) (discussing the
battering of women as a struggle for power and control); Dorothy E. Roberts, Devi-
ance, Resistance, and Love, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 179, 179-83 (discussing resistance the-
ory in relation to the Black community's "deviants and outlaws"); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 95 (1993) (situating women's
crimes within the context of patriarchal power); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The False
Dichotomy of Victimization and Agency in Feminist Legal Theory, 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 1994) (arguing that feminist legal work should explore acts of
resistance to oppression in order to move beyond the problematic victimization/
agency dichotomy).
Resistance comes in many forms. For example, it has been argued that members of
"the black community" who choose criminal lifestyles are resisting the dominant cul-
ture in that they are "refus[ing] to surrender to the stranglehold of material depriva-
tion and social constraints." See Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its
Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1778 (1992).
Similarly, Nancy Ehrenreich implicitly relies on resistance theory in The Colonization
of the Womb when she asserts that many women who refuse medical intervention
during their pregnancies are resisting the hegemonic forces of a patriarchal medical
field. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L.J. 492, 496-97
(1993). Finally, in Sapphire Bound!, Regina Austin argues that some black teenagers
who become pregnant are resisting society's mandates by controlling their own repro-
duction and rejecting the dominant culture's perception of what behaviors are appro-
priate and rational. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539, 560-61,
572.
28. Gilligan, supra note 1, at 31.
